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The management of fugitive resources across national boundaries possess significant 
challenges to organizations and policy makers. This paper investigates three key aspects 
areas that affect the management of migratory wildlife. The first issue is whether it is 
better to have a single Transfrontier park or to have several disjoint ones. We find that 
economically, it makes no difference, as long as the same institutional framework applies 
to all the disjoint areas. We however reason that from a conservation perspective, it is 
better to have a single transfrontier park due to economies of scale attainable from a 
larger reserve. We also investigate the conditions under which the local communities will 
cooperate with the conservation effort and the paper concludes that as long as the flow of 
benefits from the park authorities to the community is greater than the marginal benefit 
from the community's alternative source of income, cooperation will exist. Institutional 
setups invariably affect the success of Transfrontier park management and we discuss 
some of the responsibilities government and organizations have to ensure that the parks 
are successful. To this effect, organisations should be involved only in as much as setting 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background 
There has been a growing realisation that when dealing with natural resources, ecological 
boundary demarcation should take precedence over governance boundary demarcation so 
that management decisions have a complete effect on the ecological system. Furthermore, 
congruence between ecological boundaries and governance boundaries reduces the 
likelihood of conflicting management decisions. In dealing with fugitive natural 
resources such as wildlife, at an international level, this realisation has brought in its 
wake the creation of a good number of transfrontier national parks, examples of which 
include the three-nation Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, the two-nation Maloti-
Drakensburg Transfrontier Park, the two-nation Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, the three-
nation Limpopo/Shashe Transfrontier Conservation Area and the proposed five-nation 
Caza Transfrontier Park. Indeed the removal of fences between adj acent national parks in 
adjacent countries might help in the de-fragmentation of wildlife habitats, which has long 
been recognised as a major cause of biodiversity loss particularly in literature on large 
mammals. 
More so, trans frontier parks provide scope for enhanced social and economic benefits to 
the communities in which they are established. They can be used to enhance social 
benefits through community participation in sustainable management of the wildlife 
resources in their area. Transfrontier parks also foster cooperation among regional 
governments, through the need for governments to work together in setting up and 
effectively managing the parks. 
Motivation of the study 
The extent of enhancement of conservation under trans frontier parks will necessarily be 
affected by at least three factors: 












• The wildlife migration patterns particularly those of large range and more 
valuable species, and 
• The nature of governance institutions in each of the participating countries. 
Firstly, all participating countries ought to draw net benefits from the transfrontier park if 
conservation is to be enhanced. Country benefits from trans frontier parks usually come in 
the form of benign tourism. Additional benefits may be acquired as existence values. 
More often than not, countries would also need to create some kind of infrastructure 
within or just outside their portion of the transfrontier fence such as lodges, gravel roads, 
viewing spots, telecommunication systems and road transfer facilities in order to enhance 
tourism benefits. Countries that benefit more from wildlife conservation are expected to 
invest more in its conservation and in infrastructure which consolidates those benefits. 
Secondly, the removal of fences between adjacent national parks in adjacent countries 
will most likely see the re-emergence of such migration patterns particularly across 
political boundaries given that the quality of habitats is likely to differ in the different 
parts of the trans frontier park. Wildlife is likely to be concentrated along certain routes or 
sanctuaries within the park. Also, animal instinct could be such that wildlife tends to 
escape from high poaching risk areas to safe sanctuaries. As a result of the foregoing two 
factors, access to wildlife hot spots may not be evenly distributed amongst the 
participating countries. Needless to say that the benefits from the transfrontier park will 
consequently be affected by wildlife migration patterns but some countries might be 
better readily able to counter adverse wildlife migration effects by putting in place better 
mechanisms to navigate to wildlife hot spots than others. A classic example would be the 
construction of more water points. This changes the type of habitat and it would be 
interesting to investigate how this induces the wildlife to change their range. 
Thirdly, countries tend to differ in the governance systems (rules of behaviour, ways and 
means of enforcing these rules, procedures for mediation of conflicts, sanctions in the 
case of breach of the rules, and organizations supporting transactions) they use to manage 










might prefer to involve local communities as a way to reduce resource monitoring costs 
and increase resource protection while others might prefer to exclude local communities 
and use a more centralised approach to management. This centralized approach however, 
in the presence of ill-resourced ineffective monitoring, has historically led to collective 
action problems and has effectively turned their portions of the park into de facto open 
access areas. 
Wildlife biological processes occur at small, medium and large-scales such that their 
effective management requires that governance systems are organised in multiple scales 
that are effectively linked (Ostrom 1995). Thus the governance system must be as 
complex as the biological process it is trying to manage. It is not uncommon to find 
smaller scale organisations that are nested within larger ones, each with its own distinct 
set of rules (Ostrom 1995). Countries that promote congruence between the governance 
system and the biological process in wildlife conservation have strong governance 
institutions. Poaching is likely to be rampant in countries with weak institutions because 
poachers hunt without effective restraint. Furthermore, local communities who are 
adjacent to wildlife are likely to support and shield poachers as a way to protest their 
exclusion from wildlife management. Of concern to local communities will be whether 
the creation of the trans frontier park will entail costs for them in the form of (i) increased 
human-wildlife conflict given that there is no guarantee that wildlife will not occasionally 
wander from the parklands into the rangelands, and (ii) loss of livelihood opportunities 
such as livestock farming and of traditional hunting areas, given that local parkland 
boundaries may have to be redrawn to effectively link the local park to the neighbouring 
ones. It will be difficult to establish transfrontier parks adjacent to communities who 
stand to suffer large losses. 
In Southern Africa, the elephant is probably the single greatest species-specific factor 
influencing ecosystem conservation in protected areas (DNPWLM 1999). Perhaps this 
suggests that governance boundaries should be along the ranges of elephants and take 
refuge in it being both a keystone and umbrella species. Indeed the elephant range was 











In some countries elephant populations are exceeding carrying capacities I. If this 
situation continues unchecked it will adversely affect the parks ecosystem in that other 
species habitats might be degraded. Furthermore, the elephant's own habitat will not be 
spared. In reality this situation might also affect the tourism income opportunities. In 
isolation. affected countries would have to take drastic measures such as cUlling. While 
such measures solve the conservation problem they may adversely affect tourism 
opportunities given the way in which animal rights activists campaign against them. 
Transfrontier parks can create an avenue through which overpopulated parks could be 
relieved of their excesses by finding additional carrying capacity from neighbouring 
parks. This is particularly the case if there is excess capacity in the neighbouring parks. In 
that case, everyone potentially stands to benefit by the mere creation of the trans frontier 
park. 
Even though trans frontier arrangements are potentially conducive to sound conservation 
in the sense that wildlife, especially large range species, has access to more land, the 
same arrangements entail that a more diverse range of managers has access to wildlife 
and if the dominant majority of managers responds to perverse incentives transfrontier 
parks could actually open up more areas to biodiversity loss. In particular, given that 
wildlife moves across the countries participating in the transfrontier park why should any 
particular country make conservation sacrifices if it cannot control the other countries? 
The situation which might arise is, in part, akin to international free-riding and tragedy of 
the commons. 
Research Questions 
• When dealing with fugitive natural resources such as wildlife, is it better to have a 
trans frontier park or several disjoint ones? 
• Under what conditions might local communities actually cooperate with 
trans frontier park wildlife management? 
I We are using carrying capacity as has been historically used. Effective management capacity is used more 











• What threshold of organizational involvement in the participating countries is 
required to guarantee enhanced conservation? 
In the proposed paper we seek to build a bio-economic model for terrestrial migratory 
species such as the African elephant (loxodonta africana) in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park. We intend to investigate: 
1. The bio-economic perspective on the need for coordination of conservation 
efforts among neighbouring nations: here, we actually evaluate whether it is 
better to have a single large national park or several disjoint ones, and investigate 
how different habitat qualities affect species and how spatial dispersal helps to 
maintain viable wildlife populations 
11. The benefits culminating from coordination: we reason that to ensure 
minimisation of opposition to the trans frontier parks, we should identify the 
situations in which local communities might actually gain from them 
111. The requirements of governance organisations that guarantee increased 
conservation in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. 
Structure of the paper 
This paper will comprise six chapters. Chapter I outlines the context in which this 
research is made, the motivation for the study and research questions that stand to be 
answered. A review of the literature follows in chapter 2. The chapter seeks to expose 
some of the pertinent issues in inter-boundary conservation and how conservation effort 
has been changing through time. It also brings out some of the challenges and successes 
of transfrontier conservation methods. The next chapter explains the methodology to be 
employed. Chapter 4, the main chapter of the paper, will present the model. This chapter 
reviews the different animal migration patterns and determines the type that resembles 
elephant migration patterns in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park closest. This section 
will look at, among other things, the main types of terrestrial animal migration, 
documented elephant behavioural patterns and how their migration patterns will impact 
the model. The second section of the chapter will look at the nature of wildlife 











management and how the nature of property rights will affect conservation effort and the 
various equilibria. In Chapter 5, the policy implications of the results are discussed and in 
the last chapter, a conclusion will be given. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Rationale behind transfrontier natural resource management. 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas have gained popularity as methods of preserving and 
conserving natural resources. To this effect, a number of parks have been established in 
Southern Africa, and the main idea behind them is the fact that ecological boundaries do 
not always coincide with national/political boundaries and hence for effective 
conservation practices to prevail, management of wildlife should be based on ecosystem 
boundaries and not restricted by national boundaries. Transfrontier Parks and 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas effectively integrate areas previously segregated by 
political boundaries, to get them under a common management scheme, with the aim for 
better conservation effort. 
Munthali, (2007) identifies some of the main reasons for creating transfrontier 
conservation areas as: 
1. The need to protect reserves that span across nations 
11. The need to expand the total area that is being utilised for wildlife activities, and, 
lll. The need to re-establish seasonal migration routes Munthali (2007). 
With poverty levels consistently high in most African countries, wildlife resources have 
also been viewed as a tool that local communities and governments can actually use for 
the betterment of the lives of the people around the reserves. Singh, (1998), for example, 
takes the view that trans frontier parks and conservation areas offer increasing economic 
opportunities, diminish cultural isolation and may be used for community integration 
Singh, (1998). Transfrontier conservation areas have also been described as vehicles 











consensus among authors that wildlife, if effectively managed, may impact positively on 
the lives of the people around the resources. 
While there is consensus and acknowledgement that trans frontier areas can have a huge 
impact on the livelihood of communities, how these areas have been managed or ought to 
be managed remains debatable. Buscher et aI, (2005) argues that instead of community 
based conservation, the older. more excluding approach should be taken. Buscher argues 
that there is irrefutable evidence that African communities have failed to harness the full 
potential of wildlife resources, with some communities which are well endowed with 
natural resources and which have been given ownership failing to improve their lives. 
While this view cannot be disregarded, as there indeed are numerous cases of failures at 
community level, there are also cases of community based conservation methods that 
have worked quite well and have addressed both the conservation goals as well as the 
. I 2 economic goa s . 
Problems associated with Transfrontier Management 
Transfrontier conservation areas and parks, by virtue of their structure, are not without 
problems. One of the main challenges they face is the exclusion of most stakeholders in 
the management practices, as governments have generally assumed full ownership of the 
parks Munthali, (2007). While conservation is the main objective, the livelihood of the 
local communities should also be considered as these communities pose a threat to 
conservation effort should they not stand to benefit from the areas. The parks affect the 
communities by potentially reducing the size of area available for agricultural purposes 
and animals frequently destroy crops and property when they wander outside the 
reserves. Due to colonial history and different perceptions around access to resources and 
use between different communities, misunderstandings are bound to rise resulting in non 
cooperation Munthali (2007). 
Transfrontier parks may generally face ineffective management capacities. The level of 
coordination needed in joint operations is higher than when dealing with individually 











managed resources and in some cases management capacity for this level of coordination 
may just not exist. Thus, these parks may inherently suffer from collective action 
problems - more people have to be consulted and consensus must be reached on all key 
decisions. In cases where payoffs structures are different, and one sub area stands to 
benefit more than the others, management views and objectives regarding the way 
forward may be diametrically opposed. 
Challenges faced by the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
Other than these general issues that trans frontier parks face, the Greater Limpopo Park, 
has its own challenges. While these have been discussed in depth by other authors, this 
paper will point out some of the main issues. Saayman and Saayman (2006) point out the 
extreme poverty levels of communities living around the park. They consider the income 
structure of Mpumalanga province in South Africa, showing that the province, in which 
the Kruger National Park is situated, is one of the poorest provinces in the country. Such 
a situation thus puts pressure on the management system to stop the local communities 
from acquiring illegal off-take from the park. 
Some areas of the park have infrastructural backlogs. In the Gonarezhou Park, most roads 
are un-tarred, in bad shape and mostly accessible by off road vehicles (Spenceley et aI, 
(2008). The paper also notes that the level of other tourist infrastructure such as game 
lodges, viewing spots and other recreational facilities are only well developed in the 
South African side of the park (formerly Kruger) and not so much in other areas, 
particularly the Mozambican side. This is an issue of concern because for as long as the 
level of infrastructural development is different, benefits and costs in the different areas 
will not be the same, and this ultimately leads to coordination problems. 
The trans frontier park to date has seriously fallen short of quantifiable deliverables. 
Although much has been said about the potential of the project, the possible gains to the 
communities and gains in biodiversity enhancement, to date, not much in observable 











of a handful of elephants from the Kruger to the Gonarezhou, the park has perhaps not 
achieved anything else3. 
The motives behind the establishment have also been called into question a number of 
times, with the suggestion that South Africa stands to gain the most and wanted to find 
areas to where it could translocate excess elephants from Kruger National park at low 
cost. The Kruger had an excessive elephant population and these had to be rid of, but 
without taking drastic action such as culling which would have had bad publicity and 
taken a toll on tourism revenues. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
The paper uses bio-economic modeling in a dynamic framework. Bio-economic 
modeling takes into account the biological process of wildlife as well as the economic 
incentives of people interacting with wildlife. Joint modeling of biology and economics 
ensures that we capture human effects on the wildlife ecosystem. The management 
actions of humans will affect the wildlife ecosystem and the wildlife ecosystem will in 
tum give its feedback by changing the economic incentive structure of humans. By 
formulating a plausible model that captures the biology-economics interactions one may 
be able to predict the effects of changing key parameters of the model. This tool can then 
be used to appraise, for example, different configurations of economic incentives 
amongst countries participating in transfrontier parks. Indeed, trans frontier park 
arrangement is ultimately a joint economic and biological problem. 
Bio-economic models have been formulated to investigate biology-economics 
interactions especially for individual country situations, for example in investigating 
Integrated Community Development Projects (ICDPs) (see Shulz and Skonhoft (1996), 
Skonhoft and Solstad (1996), Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) and Skonhoft (1998). Where 
trans-boundary resource management has been investigated, fisheries have tended to 
3 Some experts will however argue that this is not so much a numbers game but the creation of the 
opportunity for elephants to be able to move around and their use of resources across time and space that 











dominate particularly migratory coastal fish species which move across country borders, 
for example Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). For terrestrial species, bio-economic models 
have tended to focus on investigating the effect of creating new protected areas in 
formerly open access lands in a particular country, for example see Johannesen and 
Skonhoft (2004). The proposed work will extend the discussion in the bio-economic 
modeling literature to include fugitive terrestrial resource management situations where 
countries come together to jointly manage previously isolated national parks and where 
wildlife migration takes place across country borders. In this work we will be helped by 
the experience of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. 
The aim of this paper is to build a model for migratory species such as the African 
elephant. However, given that wildlife frequently migrates across large areas it is 
imperative to incorporate the dynamics of wildlife migration when analysing different 
management regimes in the underlying sub areas. However, none of the preliminary 
models are explicit models of wildlife migration. The paper will therefore incorporate the 
dynamics of wildlife migration, growth patterns and the economic system under which 
the system operates to find the equilibrium steady state values and the implications these 
have on intervention effort. 
Chapter 4: The Model 
Terrestrial Animal Migration Patterns 
There are three main types, or reasons for animal migration. The first type of migration 
that affects conservation technique and effort is seasonal migration. With seasonal 
migration, the species moves from habitat to habitat dependant on the season in search 
for food. In Africa, several terrestrial species show this form of migration. As an 
example, the wildebeest in the Masai-Mara game reserve seasonally migrate in search of 
food depending on the rainfall patterns (Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2004). With seasonal 
migration, no density effects affect the movement of the species from one habitat to the 











area, all the animals move to another area where, due to the different climatic conditions, 
more food is available. This kind of movement is exhibited by the wildebeest in the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. The wildebeest stay in the protected game reserve for most of 
the year, but in the dry season, they all migrate outside the reserve into the surrounding 
environment in search of better pasture (Fryxell et aI, 1995). For these terrestrial species, 
seasonal migration naturally takes place over vast distances, as the beasts have to migrate 
from one geographical location to another. 
The serengeti-mara ecosystem as a whole, covers some 25000- 32000 square kilometers 
(Ronald et al 1989) and there is a significant rainfall gradient throughout the ecosystem, 
with some areas receiving only 800mm of rainfall a year and others over 2000 mm. It is 
this kind of vast difference that then makes it possible for seasonal migration where the 
species move from one area completely to the other, as the climatic conditions allow for 
different vegetation, nutritional value and carrying capacity per unit area. 
The African elephant has been known migrate across vast distances each season. With no 
natural enemies, does the African elephant exhibit seasonal migration in the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park? Although elephants move vast distances, assuming seasonal 
migration where the animals all move completely from one area to another solely in 
response to food availability ignores human interference and activities such as poaching, 
which have been shown to affect elephant behaviour, migration and social structure. In 
addition to this, the rainfall gradient within the park is not that steep. 
The second form of migration discussed is symmetric density dependant migration. This 
form of migration occurs between two different habitats in order to equalize densities 
between the two habitats. Symmetric migration occurs between two habitats whose 
natural conditions are generally identical and the species would move between different 
park areas based on the densities of the areas. If one area has a higher density than a 
neighbouring area, the species would migrate to the neighbouring area. When the two 
areas have the same animal density, then the rate of migration between the areas is equal 











Symmetric density dependant migration in a homogenous ecosystem which is sub 
divided two or more areas thus shows the effect of different institutional set ups that exist 
in the different areas. If the rate of harvesting in the one area is greater than in the other, 
the population in the former area will always be less. There will thus always be a positive 
flow of animals from the area with less harvesting to the one with more harvesting. This 
has profound effects on the conservation effort as it implies that as long as animals can 
move freely between the areas and as long as the extraction effort in the unprotected area 
is high enough, the species may actually become endangered as it will always move into 
the extraction area. 
The African elephant however, is less likely to follow a symmetric density dependant 
migration pattern. Although physical conditions in the three different management areas4 
of the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Parks are the same, studies have shown most large 
terrestrial herbivores, including the elephant, to be particularly sensitive to the natural 
dangers in their habitat (Ny aka ana et aI, 200 I). Human activities such as culling and 
poaching have led to elephants congesting in areas where there is less human 
interference. Modeling elephant migration as symmetric would imply that the quality 
habitat throughout the park is identical, i.e. the quality of food is the same, human 
interference is identical, and thus the habitat of choice is solely determined by the amount 
of food available - in which case would be determined by the species' population density. 
In this particular case therefore, the elephants would be distributed evenly, and there 
would be a positive flow of animals to that area whose density becomes lower. This 
however is hardly practical as the geographical characteristics differ within the park and 
human interference is not the same. This paper therefore assumes that the African 
elephant will not follow a pattern of symmetric migration as this oversimplifies the 
natural conditions that exist in the park and ignores documented elephant behaviour. 
The last type of migration this paper will discuss is asymmetric density dependant 
migration. With this kind of migration, there is movement in and out of the conservation 











area despite the population densities being the same. For species that follow this kind of 
migration, the reason for migration is usually a result of different density effects between 
the two or more habitats that the species can live in. Here, density effects refers to the 
impact on the livelihood of the species due to its own density in the area and due to that 
of other species as well, particularly predator species. If for example one habitat allows 
for predator hunting and another does not, the former will be less favourable to the 
species as it lends the species to higher rates of predation due to the higher number of 
predators. In equilibrium, this habitat would therefore naturally have a lower total stock 
level than the second. This however is a static equilibrium, as it considers a one period 
flow from one habitat to the other. A multi-period analysis, allowing for the migration to 
happen continuously over successive periods, would suggest that asymmetric density 
dependant migration will lead to fluctuating levels of stock levels in the two habitats. 
Assuming equal popUlation densities in the two habitats at first, and then one is allowed 
to minimize the number of predators affecting the species, despite the same density of 
species, animals will migrate to the safer habitat and will result in a higher stock level 
and population density than the first. 
Studies show that large herbivores such as buffalo, elephant, rhinoceros and hippo are 
regulated by food supply and not natural predators (Fryxell, et aI, 1995). Due to their size 
and/or social structure, these animals face minimal disruptions in their normal routines by 
natural enemies, and thus the presence, or absence, of predators does not have much 
migratory impact. In the case of the African Elephant however, poaching and human 
activity may induce this kind of migration. 
In a transfontier park whose monitoring is managed by different institutions, although 
hunting of the species may be illegal in both habitats, one institution may enforce these 
property rights better than the other, leading to rampant poaching in the one and none in 
the other. In this particular case, where poaching is consistently practiced, asymmetric 











It is this type of migration that suits the elephant migration pattern in the Greater 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park the closest. There is very minimal evidence of seasonally 
migrating elephants, where the elephants move completely from one area to another and 
alternate from season to season. Symmetric density dependant migration is too simplified 
as it assumes conditions throughout the park are homogenous, a case that is not so. The 
asymmetric density dependant pattern however, seems to suit the species closest. This 
allows for migration to take place between different habitats, with higher densities of 
elephants in areas where the habitat is favourable, such as poaching free areas. This 
pattern also allows for density modeling, with the rate of migration also dependant on the 
density of animals in the area, as this affects food supply. The elephants are therefore 
expected to be more concentrated in santuaries, but this would also be limited by the food 
supply. In equilibrium therefore, there would be more elephants per unit area in the 
preferred habitat. So how is this represented mathematically? 
The mathematical formulation used for this migration pattern draws from the work of 
Sanchirico and Wilen, (2005) and that of Skonhoft and Armstrong, (2005). The species 
migrates spatially across the park according to an asymmetric density dependant fashion. 
This means the migration pattern will have a dispersal rate,m, which is a constant value 
for each species. Sanchirico and Wilen, (2005) refer to this value as the coefficient of 
dispersal and it simply shows the intrinsic dispersal rate of a species. Species that have a 
very low spatial movement will have a low value and those that exhibit more dispersed 
migration, a higher one. As the species migration is affected by density, a coefficient of 
migration, a, will be included. The migration rate from area 1 to area 2, denoted Ml may 




Where: Slt and SZt are the total stocks of animals at time t in area 1 and 2 respectively, 
Klt and KZt are the respective carrying capacities of area 1 and 2 











a is the coefficient of migration, dependant on the relative density of area 1 
This model allows for flexibility on the assumptions about migration. It allows for 
differing spatial movement rates between different species, through the parameter m. For 
any species, this parameter would be constant, and determined through empirical studies. 
It would however be different from species to species as different species have differing 
rates of movement. Species with a high degree of spatial movement will have a large 
value of m as opposed to those with minimal movement which would record a much 
lower value. 
It also allows for asymmetric density dependant migration through the parameter a. This 
parameter is the coefficient of migration with the value changing as the desirability of the 
area the species is in changes. 
The case of the "t'I Present Value maximising owner. 
In this model, we assume there are two wildlife areas, area 1 and area 2. Both areas are 
privately owned and maximize the present value of the net benefits they obtain from the 
park. Benefits are in the form of two main sources of revenue, the first arising directly 
from tourism and the other, from proceeds5 from the sale of game and other game related 
products from the park. The costs incurred by the management authority are in the form 
habitat management (waterholes, fireguards, etc) and tourism infrastructure (gravel roads, 
viewing spots, lodges etc). Elephants, being both a keystone species and an umbrella 
species are the single most influential species that affects the management of the wildlife 
areas. They have the capacity to exploit the natural habit if they exceed the carrying 
capacity, but at lower numbers they can increase biodiversity and spatial distribution of 
other animals (Baxter, 1996). In this model, the wildlife areas will use elephant stock as 
their control variable for maximising the net benefits from the areas. 
5 These proceeds are not off-take but in fact revenues arising from translocating animals to other parks to 











This model can easily be extended to include other key species, by expanding the model 
to a stacked model, as used in Sanchirico and Wilen, 20056. In an expanded stacked 
model, the net benefits and costs of an individual species are added to those from other 
species and the control problem solved simultaneously for all the required species. 
Benefits 
Elephants benefit the park in the following ways: 
1. Tourism 
The African Elephant is one of Africa's "Big Five" and continues to fascinate many 
people. The elephant is considered an appealing animal partly due to its size, charisma 
and the imminent threat of danger that always comes with being close to one (Reynolds 
and Braithwaite, 2001). It is because of this special appeal, that tourists a have continued 
to flock the wildlife reserves in Africa, to catch a glimpse of this species. This paper will 
assume that the net benefits from tourism are directly dependant on the stock of elephants 
that exist in the park owing to people who want to come and observe this animal in its 
natural habitat. 
Second, as a keystone and umbrella species, elephants indirectly regulate the total stock 
of other species in the park. Elephants are one of the most destructive species but are also 
known to be instrumental in the dispersal of seeds and regulation of veld types. These 
activities ultimately affect the stocks of all the other animals in the park and together, 
these two effects will directly affect the number of tourists that are lured to the park. 
11. Proceeds 
The other benefit considered is proceeds from the sale of game and any other wildlife 
related products that the park may produce. This parameter represents all revenues from 
(, In the stacked model, the elephants would be for example species i and the model allows for n species, 
where n > 1. For a detailed illustration of such a stacked model, refer to Sanchirico and Wilen, 











park activities such as the auction of excess elephants to other parks with excess capacity, 
revenues from trophy hunting, once off concessionary sales of ivory where permitted and 
game meat. The revenue stream from proceeds unlike that from tourism, will involve 
some form of harvesting practice7. The paper assumes the Schaefer harvest function: 
H = eES where e is the coefficient of harvest, E is the effort put in to harvest and 5 is 
the total stock of elephant available. 
Given the above discussion, the benefit function has two parameters, the stock level,S 
and the level of harvest, H and the absolute level of benefit is obtained by multiplying 
these parameters with the going market price,? 
Costs 
The main cost of keeping elephants is the regulation of the size of the herd. They would 
need to be tracked, provided with sufficient waterholes and fenced off from human 
settlement areas and so forth. This cost is assumed to be directly dependant on the total 
stock of elephants in the park. 
The other cost accruing to the park is that of harvesting. At the end of each period, the 
excess elephants need to be captured, either to be sold off to other parks with the capacity 
to effectively manage them,(this is a common occurrence within national parks and 
tourism facilities), or as an extreme measure, culled, within the context of compensation 
for damage causing animal impacts on neighbouring communities8. 
Growth 
Migration patterns and the growth patterns have paramount importance in the analysis of 
equilibrium states and how these may change with time. The rate of change of the total 
stock in each of the sub areas, 1 and 2, will depend on the growth rate and the rate of 
7 This harvest practice entails capturing the animals to be auctioned off, thus is not harvesting for 
consumption purposes. 
8 Should the elephant population exceed its carrying capacity, the species will break into neighbouring 
areas for food, thus costing the parks more in terms of compensation. Excess elephants also decrease the 











migration. The growth rate of the species will follow the logistic pattern, with the rate of 
change of the stock size dependent upon an intrinsic growth rate, and a density dependant 
factor. The model assumes species homogeneity, i.e. there is no difference in the intrinsic 
growth rate of the species between the two habitats. This is in line with the standard 
definition and use of intrinsic growth rates and does not alter the set up of the problem. 
The growth rate of the species is given by: 
g = rSt (1- ~J 
Where: r is the intrinsic growth rate of the species, 
S is the total stock level, 
K is the carrying capacity 
Combining the growth and migration patterns together, the rate of change of the stock 
level in area I thus can be represented as follows: 
Where: hlt is the harvest in area 1, and all the other parameters as described before. 
In a present value maximization scheme, where each area maximizes the net present 
value of benefits, the paper assumes that the revenues from proceeds, are linearly 
dependant on the level of harvesting, h and that the revenues from tourism, are also 
linearly dependant on the stock level, S. Given an inverse demand function for elephant 
related products, the proceeds would be a function of the total amount of harvest 
multiplied by the market price for those products. While this assumption may appear 
restrictive, in an expanded stacked model that allows for more than one species modeling, 
it is indeed the abundance and density of the main species (such as the big five) that 











The present value maximizing owner will thus be faced with a decision to maximize net 
benefits inter temporally through optimal management of the keystone species. The 
decision problem for each of the owners becomes: 
Subject to: 
dSlt ( Slt) (Slt SZt) = rSlt 1-- - m a--- - hlt dt Klt Klt K2t 
And an initial stock level 5(0) = So 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
And the associated first order conditions: 
dB ac 
(ii) dAt = QAt _ At [r _ 2r Slt _ rna] + ac 
dt Klt Klt aSlt 
C···) dSlt - S (1 Slt) (Slt Su) h] 111 --rlt -- -m a--- - It 
dt Klt Klt K2t 
Along the optimal efficient path, the rate return from area 1 (which is also identical to 
that of 2) is given by: 
dAt ac aB 
(iv) 0' = "dt"!1 + [r _ 2r Slt _ rna] _ aSll + aSll 











How does this compare to the rate of return that can be obtained from a single 
trans frontier park? 
A single present value maximizing trans frontier park, with carrying capacity K and stock 
size S, under the same conditions as above would maximize: 
Subject to: 
dSt (St) 
dt = rS t 1 - K
t 
- H 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
And solving this for Hotelling's efficiency condition gives: 
Comparing equations (iv) and (v) will show that from an efficiency perspective, it makes 
no difference whether there is a single park or two disjoint ones, as long as the 
institutions surrounding governance are the same. The right hand side of both equations 
shows that the rate of return from the resource is given by the proportionate change in the 
shadow price of the resource with time. This rate of change would be equal regardless of 
the size of the park9. In equation (iv), the next term is different from that of the single 
9 Assuming that the market for the resource is the same, i.e. the pool of tourists is the same and the market 











park. There is an additional term due to migration, but since we are considering two 
areas, net migration in the steady state is zero thus the rate of the return in the small parks 
would be the same as that in the joint transfrontier park. The last two terms, show the 
proportional change in costs due to an increase in stock size and the increase in benefits 
due a change in stock size and these are equal under the single park and the disjoint ones. 
Economically, there is thus no difference between having a transfrontier park or several 
disjoint ones. 
Solving for the explicit stock levels shows the same result for both the disjoint area and 




However, we can point out a number of cases in which single transfrontier park would be 
a better tool for conservation as opposed to several disjoint parks. The following 
considerations make a single transfrontier park a better conservation technique than 
several disjoint ones. 
• In most cases, park boundaries are based on governance demarcations and not 
along natural habitat boundaries or ecosystems boundaries. If Area 1 and 2 are 
demarcated along these political boundaries, then natural migration patterns and 
breeding grounds are affected. Area 1 may encompass the main breeding habitat, 
but due to fencing off along governance lines, the species as a whole may not 
have adequate access to this. This ultimately affects the rate of growth as it would 
be lowered since migration patterns and breeding grounds are restricted. A single 
Transfrontier park that removes these artificial barriers, and bases management 
along ecosystem boundaries would have a higher total stock level. 
• A trans frontier park if effectively managed will result in lower running costs due 
to the scale effect. In the case of a present value maximizing owner, a larger park 











will have lower overhead costs per person who visits the park, as the owners take 
advantage increasing returns to scale on revenues and proceeds. Instead of 
incurring the same overheads, overheads are split among the different areas 
proportionately and this increases the net benefits available for distribution, either 
to the owners for more conservation benefit or to the local communities. 
Considering this scale effect, a single transfrontier park, we concludefrom a conservation 
perspective, is better than several disjoint ones. A park managed along estuarine and 
ecosystem boundaries will have fewer disruptions to animal migratory and breeding 
patterns, allows for natural spatial dispersal of species and thus will result in more 
biodiversity and a higher stock of animals. 
Conditions for cooperation 
One of the key issues that impact the success or failure of conservation effort in is the 
involvement of the local communities. Communities may disrupt conservation effort 
because it denies them access to the land. Extension of conservation areas may involve 
relocating people to other areas or reducing the size of their farmland. Damage causing 
animals also destroy their crops and in cases without well defined property rights 
communities may have distaste for any governance system imposed on them, with 
regards to how they mayor may not interact with the wildlife around them subject to a 
sense of ownership, or a lack thereof. It is therefore crucial that in trans frontier park 
management, the local communities are involved to the extent that their objectives and 
those of the conservation authorities are syncronised. Without this synchrony, the conflict 
of interest that would result may cause the conservation objectives to fall short of their 
potential. 
In the case of transfrontier parks, this problem poses a bigger challenge than internally 
contained reserves as due to their size, there could be significant populations to consider. 
As in the case of the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park, these people actually belong to 











different. Management authorities have to find a way to deal with this possible threat to 
conservation and this section gives insight into the necessary conditions that should 
prevail before the locals may be expected to cooperate. 
The general consensus in the literature is that local people will cooperate with 
conservation effort as long as they stand to benefit from the cooperation (see Swanson 
and Babier 1992; Mangel. et al 1996; Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2004). What is this level 
of benefit that they require to cooperate? 
Local communities are considered to be those people who live within and or around the 
boundaries of the trans frontier park. The paper assumes that they engage in two main 
activities, agricultural production and wildlife hunting. It is also assumed that the 
individual community members have the same preferences and production capacities and 
thus can be collapsed into one representative agent. (These are the same assumptions 
applied in Johannesen and Skonhoft (2004)) 
This representative community has two sources of subsistence, it can work on the land 
for agricultural produce or may hunt game from the park for food. As the paper wants to 
establish the minimum conditions for cooperation, initially assume that property rights 
solely belong to private owners of the resource. These private owners are pure profit 
maximizers, i.e. economic profit is their sole priority. Tourism revenues and revenues 
from the park are directly linked 0 the stock of animals, level of biodiversity and thus 
their goal is to have the largest stock of animals permissible and as much bio-diversity as 
possible. To this effect, the pure profit maximiser has the same objectives as the 
conservist, as the revenue stream is directly dependant on the stock of game and 
biodiversity. The profit maximiser maximizes inter-temporal profit and the rate ofretum 
obtained from the park is as in equation (v). 
With no property rights, all forms of hunting are illegal, but due to the size of the park 
area, it is impossible for the private owners to exclude the community completely. Net 











Costs come in the form of productivity costs and hunting costs. With this simplification, 
the community will make economic decisions based on this net benefit function specified 
as follows: 
(vi) NB = PA(E) + PH(E,S) - C(Ea) - C(EH ) 
Where: N B is the net benefit. 
P is the price of agricultural produce and harvese 1 
A(E) is the 1111111111 from agriculture 
H is the amount of harvest from hunting 
C(Ea) is the cost of agricultural effort 
C (E H) is the cost of harvesting effort 
Agricultural productivity varies from season to season, depending on variables such as 
rainfall and natural disasters, the area under cultivation, fertilizer and pesticides and the 
level of effort used. The paper assumes all other factors, except the level of effort, to be 
constant. This makes the net benefits from agricultural productivity a function of the level 
of effort only.12With no property rights, there is no guarantee for lifetime benefits from 
hunting, thus the community makes decisions on how to allocate effort between the two 
sources of livelihood intra-temporarily, in this case seasonally. 
The problem of the community is thus to maximize equation (vi) with respect to effort, 




II The community makes decisions based on a quantity of produce that costs the same as some known 
quantity of wildlife harvest. 
12 This assumption allows us to focus on impact of the community on the game reserves and given in most 
of these communities the production methods are labour intensive anyway, the amount of time spend 











This can be expressed alternatively as: 
PA E - C Ea = CEH - PHE 
When maximizing seasonal benefits, the community will attribute extra effort to hunting 
until the marginal net benefits between hunting and agricultural activity are the same 
During each season, the community ensures that the marginal benefit from agricultural 
productivity, (PA E - CEJ, is equal to the marginal loss from harvesting\3, C EH - PHE . 
As long as the owner can produce a flow of net benefits per season equal to the marginal 
productivity of agriculture, then the community will be maximizing welfare. This flow of 
benefits should impose an effort cost equal to the cost of agricultural effort. 
In conclusion to this section, as long as the flow of benefits from the park to the 
community in each time period is greater than the marginal net benefit from their 
alternative source of livelihood, the community will be maximizing welfare and from an 
economic incentive point of view, has no reasons to disrupt conservation effort. 
This however has interesting implications to the management of trans frontier national 
parks. The minimum flow of benefits for a community to cooperate to the conservation 
effort should be equal to the marginal productivity of the community's alternative source 
of income. As such transfrontier parks should be cheaper to manage in areas whose 
communities face very limited production possibilities as compared to communities who 
have wider possibilities. 
Chapter 5: Policy implications 
The institutional framework surrounding the management of trans frontier parks is crucial 
to the success of the park. Given that the present value maximizing model can will lead to 












an optimal utilization of resources, this paper argues that the role of government and 
organisations should be limited to institutional development that aids and promotes 
private ownership, but with a profit sharing scheme that ensures the cooperation of the 
local people. What are these roles and responsibilities therefore? 
Governments should primarily ensure congruent legislation between countries involved. 
Disparities in legislation give rise to unequal benefit schemes and this would result in an 
imbalance of benefits from the park. In cases where this has not been done effectively, 
local communities have benefited unequally and this has led to a breakdown in 
cooperation. In the case of the African elephant, governments should ensure that all 
legislatures pertaining to the species is the same in all the three countries. Rules 
pertaining to the movement, control and export of the animals have to be aligned such 
that there is a common base for operation between the countries involved. 
Of particular importance are the rights and responsibilities of the local people and their 
constitutional rights. In cases where constitutions state that the local people may not be 
moved, complex implications may arise where the area under management has to be 
increased for greater conservation, for example. 
Well defined property rights are essential. Without well defined property rights, benefit 
schemes are affected and disputes over rights and privileges are rife. The owners of the 
resource should be known and so should be their rights and responsibilities. To this 
effect, organisations should ensure an effective policing mechanism that will be 
responsible for bringing to book those who infringe any of the rules. 
Governments should seek to restore natural ecosystem boundaries and equalize 
management capacity between the different countries. Between the three countries 
involved in the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park, infrastructural differences are huge 
and this affects the conservation effort in two main ways. Firstly, it results in habitat 
quality differences which in some cases will result in lower stock levels. Using the 











poachers will have a higher stock of animals. This will lead to less harvesting costs and 
increased tourism revenue for the park authorities. The area will thus gain at the expense 
of the other and a breakdown of the relationship may follow. 
Governments should ensure that the management capacity of all the different 
management authorities is the same, to the extent that they may be able to carry out 
agreed instructions and within the required timeframes. With equal management capacity, 
and habitat homogeneity, the net benefits accruing to all member stakeholders are 
structurally the same, and it should be easier to achieve coordinated activity. 
Government should align conservation goals between countries. Conservation ideas and 
approaches vary and this may lead to conflict when the goals of the trans frontier park are 
different between countries. A country whose elephant population is thriving may be 
concerned more about efficient extraction of benefits and less about preservation. In such 
cases there would be conflict and conservation effort will stall. To this effect government 
should ensure identical park management regimes, and this paper would advocate the 
present value maximizing regime. Governments should ensure that all park authorities in 
the three countries take this view in their management. The same management regimes 
will ultimately align cost structures and benefit flow and this will result in cooperation. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The paper begins by an analysis of whether it is better to have a single park or several 
disjoint ones. Economically, it makes no difference, when operating under the same 
institutional environment. However, from a conservation perspective, a single 
trans frontier park is better, as it introduces a scale effect, with potentially higher growth 
rates of species, due to habitat preservation and maintenance of seasonal patterns and 











Local communities are an important stakeholder in this conservation effort, without 
whose support conservation may be difficult, fail to achieve its full potential or merely be 
a failure. Local communities will thus have to be included in the benefit stream and the 
paper shows that as long as the stream of benefits from the park authority is greater than 
the stream of benefits from the alternative source of income, they would cooperate as 
they face an opportunity cost for not cooperating. 
Lastly, the paper discusses the threshold of organisational involvement that is required to 
make management of fugitive natural resources. In this regard, organisations are 
responsible for setting up an institutional framework that ensures a mutual goal in 
managing the park and that allows for equalising the benefits between the different 












Special thanks go to my supervisor, Dr E. Muchapondwa for his help and supervision 












1. Armstrong, C.W. and A. Skonhoft 2005. Marine reserves. A bio-economic model 
with asymmetric density dependent migration. Forthcoming in Ecological 
Economics. 
2. Baxter, J. Modeling the Impact of the African Elephant, Loxodonta africana, on 
Woody Vegetation in Semi-Arid Savannas B.A. (University of Dublin, Trinity 
College) 1996. Forthcoming 
3. Biischer, B. Dietz, T, 2005. Conjunctions of Governance:The State and the 
Conservation-development Nexus in Southern Africa, The Journal of 
Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies vol. 4, no. 2, 2005 
4. Fryxell, l M. (1995), 'Aggregation and Migration by Grazing Ungulates in 
Relation to Resources and Predators, in A. R. E. Sinclair and P. Arcese, eds., 
Serengeti II(pp. 257-273). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
5. Hackle, lD. (1999): Community Conservation and the Future of Africa's 
Wildlife. Conservation Biology, vol. 13,4: 726-734. 
6. Hannesson, R., 1998. Marine reserves: what would they accomplish? Marine 
Resource Economics, 13: 159-170. 
7. Homans, F.R. and lE. Wilen, 1997, A model of regulated open access resource 
use, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32(1), 1-21. 
8. Johannesen, A.B. and A. Skonhoft, 2004, Property rights and natural resource 
I 
conservation. A bio-economic model with numerical illustrations from the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem, Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume 28 
469-488 
9. Johannesen, A. Skonhoft, A. Tourism, poaching and wildlife conservation: what 
can integrated conservation and development projects accomplish? Resource and 
Energy Economics 27 (2005) 208-226 
10. Mangel, M. et al. (1996), 'Principles for the Conservation of Wild Living 











11. Munthali, S.M, 2007. Transfrontier conservation areas: Integrating biodiversity 
and poverty alleviation in Southern Africa, Natural Resources Forum, 31 (2007) 
51-60 
12. Nyakaana S, Abe EL, Arctander P, Siegismund HR (2001). DNA evidence for 
elephant social behaviour breakdown in Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda. 
Anim Cons, 4: 231-237. 
13. Ostrom E. 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
collective actions. Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press. 
14. Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. "Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity." In 
Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues. S. Hanna and 
M. Munasinghe eds. Washington, DC: The Beijer International Institute of 
Ecololgical Economics and the World Bank 
15. Sanchirico, J.N. Wilen, J .E., 1999. Bioeconomics of spatial exploitation in a 
patchy environment, Journal of Environronmental Economics and Management, 
37 (1999) 129-150. 
16. Sanchirico, J.N. Wilen, J.E., 2001. A bioeconomic model of marine reserve 
creation Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 42 (2001) 257-
276. 
17. Sanchirico, IN. Wilen, lE.,,2005. Optimal spatial management of renewable 
resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 50 (2005) 23-46. 
18. Schulz, C.E. Skonhoft, A. Wildlife management, land-use and conflicts. South 
African Journal of Wildlife Research 26:44,151-159,12/1996. 
19. Singh, J., 1998. The lessons learnt: The development and management of 
transboundary parks world-wide. Contribution to the USAID study on the 











20. Skonhoft, A. (1998), 'Resource Utilisation, Property Rights and Welfare. Wildlife 
and the Local People, Ecological Economics 26(1),67-80. 
21. Skonhoft, A. and Armstrong, C.W., 2005. Conservation of wildlife. A 
bioeconomic model of a wildlife reserve under pressure of habitat destruction and 
harvesting outside the reserve. Natural Resource Modeling, 18:69-90s 
22. Skonhoft, A., J.T. Solstad. [1996]. Wildlife Management, Illegal Hunting and 
Conflicts: A Bioeconomic Analysis. Environment and Development Economics 
1:165-181. 
23. Skonhoft, A. and J. T. Solstad (1998), 'The Political Economy of Wildlife 
Exploitation, Land Economics 74( 1), 16-31. 
24. Spenceley, A., 2003. Tourism, local livelihoods and the private sector in South 
Africa: Case studies on the growing role of the private sector in natural resources 
management. Sustainable livelihoods in Southern Africa. Research paper 8 . 
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. 
25. Spenceley, A. Dzingirai, P. & Tangawamira, Z. Economic impacts oftransfrontier 
conservation areas: tourism in the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation 
Area. Report to IUCN Southern Africa sustainable use specialist group and the 
University of the Witwatersrand. 2008 
26. Swanson, T. M. and E. B. Barbier (1992), Economics for the Wilds: Wildlife, 













Sub1ect to- = rS 1 - - - H . dSt (St) 
J dt t Kt 
And initial stock level 5(0) = 50 
Foe 
1. 
aH C _ 0 _ dB _ ac _ 1 
- - ILt aH dHt aHt 
11. 
ditt [St] ac dB - = OAt - At r - 2r - + - - -dt Kt aSt dSt 
lI1. dSt = rS (1 - St) -H] = 0 dt t Kt t 
Solving for the steady state stock levels. 
Assume: B(Ht,St) = P(H + {lS), C = wE, and H = eES 
c ( wH rS
2 
H = P H + {lS) - - + A[rS - - - H] 
eS K 
From i, P = W + A 
eS 
From ii 0 = OA - A [r - zrs] - wH - PfJ 
, K eS 2 
F ··· H 5 rS
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Solve the three simultaneous equations to get 
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